Theory — legitimacy, mandate and accountability of randomly selected bodies
Updated: 2026-10-05. The strongest contested zone in the corpus.
Concept
What makes a sortition-based body’s output legitimate — and to whom is such a body accountable when no one elected it?
Definitions / competing meanings
- Input legitimacy: authorisation at the front end — commission by an authority, representative recruitment, fair procedure (SRC-0100, SRC-0113).
- Throughput legitimacy: quality of the process itself — deliberative conditions, transparency of method, evidence integrity (SRC-0101, SRC-0114).
- Output legitimacy: the quality and uptake of recommendations — including the receiving authority’s response (SRC-0100).
- Mandate: the claimed authority of the assembly’s output — ranges from pure advice to referendum-triggering to permanent co-decision (Brussels).
Major theoretical arguments
- Normative (for): mini-publics are legitimacy resources — they insert considered public judgement into systems otherwise dominated by party/electoral logic (SRC-0105, SRC-0111).
- Normative (against): Lafont’s dilemma — either recommendations route back through public deliberation (in which case the mini-public adds a deliberative prompt, not authority), or they bypass it (in which case descriptive resemblance cannot substitute for authorisation) (SRC-0104).
- Systems view: legitimacy is a property of the deliberative system, not the mini-public alone — the assembly’s role depends on its coupling to the wider public sphere and institutions (SRC-0111, SRC-0112).
Practical implications
- Legitimacy is staged: a statutory commission + transparent lottery + protected deliberation + published recommendations + mandatory response is a chain, each link separately defensible (SRC-0043 vs SRC-0068 show the difference one statutory link makes).
- Accountability of a random body cannot be electoral — so it operates through method transparency, published rationale, and mandatory institutional response (SRC-0043, SRC-0030 private-deliberation rule, SRC-0100).
Critiques / limitations
- “Trust us, we’re representative” fails if the funnel is opaque (Assemble/HotP’s self-described weighting is weaker evidence than CA UK’s published tables — SRC-0068 vs SRC-0038).
- Accountability gaps are structural, not accidental: even strong recommendation regimes (Leeds per-item responses, Ostbelgien justified rejection) leave implementation unaddressed (SRC-0047, SRC-0021, SRC-0027).
Operationalisation in the corpus
- Strongest legitimacy chain observed: Scotland CA — statutory convening duty + statutory response deadline + published response (SRC-0043–SRC-0046).
- Weakest: movement-led assemblies (HotP, XR) substitute external legitimacy (scale of participation, publicness) for a receiving authority (SRC-0068, SRC-0070).
Cicada relevance
- A Cicada record should always be able to answer: who commissioned it, on what basis; what must respond to its output and by when; what happens if it doesn’t. The case template’s mandate/response fields encode exactly this theory.