Institutional pattern library
CA-R2 requirements record. Updated: 2026-10-05. Compares the institutional patterns evidenced in the CA-R1 corpus. No preferred constitutional model is chosen — the requirement is that Cicada Assemblies be capable of representing and supporting each pattern without prematurely committing to one.
Pattern A — One-off advisory assembly
Evidence: Ireland (SRC-0017, SRC-0021), Climate Assembly UK (SRC-0038), Scotland’s Climate Assembly (SRC-0041–SRC-0046), Citizens’ Assembly of Scotland (SRC-0044, SRC-0045).
- Source of legitimacy: commissioning authority’s standing (parliament/government); rigorous published selection; facilitated deliberation quality.
- Membership basis: stratified civic lottery from postal/register invitations; fixed one-off cohort.
- Selection method: stratified random selection from respondent pool.
- Permanence: none — bounded lifespan, dissolves on completion.
- Agenda authority: commissioner/statute sets the question in advance.
- Mandate: advisory recommendation.
- Response obligation: ranges none→statutory (Scotland 6-month statutory response is the corpus’s strongest, SRC-0043; CA UK non-statutory government response).
- Accountability: through response + publication; no continuing institution to hold.
- Relationship to elected bodies: advisory to the commissioning body; no shared decision-making.
- Strengths: bounded cost and scope; high evidence quality; easiest to stand up; clean legitimacy story.
- Risks: impact depends entirely on the receiving authority’s goodwill where response is non-statutory; no institutional memory; one-off political window.
- Software implications: needs the full lifecycle once — selection→membership→deliberation→output→response tracking; no rotation/cohort machinery.
- Cicada requirements: represent bounded-term assembly, mandate type, response obligation, recommendation→response→implementation chain.
- Unresolved questions: how a one-off’s recommendations survive a change of government; whether follow-up duty should outlive the assembly itself.
Pattern B — Permanent rotating citizens’ institution
Evidence: Ostbelgien permanent citizens’ council + citizens’ dialogues (SRC-0021, SRC-0025), Paris annual-cohort assembly with droit de suite (SRC-0027), Brussels permanent climate citizens’ assembly (SRC-0132–SRC-0135).
- Source of legitimacy: legal/institutional basis (decree, ordonnance, council resolution) + rotation + bounded mandate.
- Membership basis: rotating membership drawn by sortition, refreshed in fractions (Ostbelgien 18-month terms in thirds; Brussels climate renews by thirds; Paris annual promotions).
- Selection method: repeated or rolling stratified draws; rotation events are themselves selection events.
- Permanence: permanent institution; members are temporary.
- Agenda authority: can include self-agenda-setting (Ostbelgien citizens’ council sets jury agendas — the corpus’s strongest citizen agenda authority).
- Mandate: advisory or agenda-setting; Ostbelgien parliament may reject only with justification.
- Response obligation: institutionalised (justified rejection, droit de suite annual tracking).
- Accountability: rotation + transparency + bounded mandate prevent incumbency — but permanence concentrates influence in the secretariat if unchecked (SRC-0118).
- Relationship to elected bodies: parallel institution with a defined channel into parliament/council.
- Strengths: institutional memory, recurring capacity, agenda autonomy, visible accountability machinery.
- Risks: professionalisation of repeat participants; permanence in law ≠ permanence in fact (Brussels arrêté lapse, SRC-0133); incumbency capture.
- Software implications: cohort/term/rotation model, reserve lifecycle, institutional memory, self-agenda machinery, tracking instruments.
- Cicada requirements: represent permanent institution containing successive cohorts; rotation schedules; cross-cohort memory vs member-term boundaries.
- Unresolved questions: how much continuity staff vs members should carry; legal consequences of a failed implementing instrument.
Pattern C — Standing local assembly with recurring cohorts
Evidence: Newham permanent citizens’ assembly (SRC-0047, SRC-0048), Leeds citizens’ jury (SRC-0047 as comparator).
- Source of legitimacy: council commitment + local civic lottery + visible public agenda choice.
- Membership basis: local civic lottery; recurring waves; carry-over arrangements documented.
- Selection method: stratified local draw refreshed per wave.
- Permanence: standing commitment rather than statute — politically revocable.
- Agenda authority: public topic vote (Newham) — the corpus’s most direct public agenda mechanism.
- Mandate: advisory to council.
- Response obligation: standing council response commitment (below statute, above courtesy).
- Accountability: council commitment + local visibility; weaker than legal duty.
- Relationship to elected bodies: advisory to a single local authority.
- Strengths: democratically legible at neighbourhood scale; agenda legitimacy from public vote; cheap recurrence.
- Risks: commitment survives only while the council honours it; small-area frames have thin coverage; capacity limits.
- Software implications: local invitation frames, wave-based cohorts, public agenda input channel.
- Cicada requirements: represent recurring local cohorts and a council commitment object; support non-digital participation routes.
- Unresolved questions: durability of a commitment-based (non-statutory) institution across administrations.
Pattern D — Hybrid elected + sortition institution
Evidence: Brussels deliberative committees — parliamentary rules mix elected MPs with drawn citizens (SRC-0030, SRC-0068).
- Source of legitimacy: parliamentary rules + electoral + descriptive representativeness combined.
- Membership basis: mixed — elected members plus sortition-selected citizens in one decision body (Brussels: MPs + ~45 citizens).
- Selection method: stratified draw under parliamentary rules with statutory protections.
- Permanence: permanent mechanism within parliament, instantiated per topic.
- Agenda authority: parliamentary committees with citizen membership.
- Mandate: committee recommendations carry parliamentary weight — closer to decision power than any pure mini-public in the corpus.
- Response obligation: committee reports to the chamber.
- Accountability: parliamentary follow-up + statutory process protections.
- Relationship to elected bodies: integrated — not parallel.
- Strengths: shortest path from deliberation to institutional uptake; shares legitimacy between election and lot.
- Risks: elected members may dominate agenda and floor; citizen members can be structurally junior; complexity of mixed rules.
- Software implications: mixed-member rosters, distinct role/authority sets inside one body, parliamentary-procedure records.
- Cicada requirements: represent a body whose membership mixes selection methods and whose authority derives from the host institution.
- Unresolved questions: citizen-to-elected power ratio that preserves citizen voice; whether hybridity scales beyond a parliament committee.
Pattern E — Open / self-selected people’s assembly
Evidence: Assemble / House of the People (SRC-0063–SRC-0067), XR-style open people’s assembly methodology (SRC-0066).
- Source of legitimacy: openness itself — anyone may attend; legitimacy is participatory, not statistical.
- Membership basis: self-nomination/open entry, sometimes with nominated local delegates or weighted entry lotteries to manage scale.
- Selection method: none (or weighted open lottery); expressly not random sampling.
- Permanence: movement-intended permanent chamber (HotP aspiration); operationally episodic.
- Agenda authority: movement/charter; emergent.
- Mandate: none claimed from the state — self-declared representation.
- Response obligation: none — no receiving authority exists.
- Accountability: to participants and the movement; public visibility substitutes for formal accountability.
- Relationship to elected bodies: outside them — pressure/legitimacy claims rather than institutional channel.
- Strengths: zero barrier to entry; mobilising capacity; can convene where institutions won’t act (NI civil-society CA during Stormont suspension, SRC-0137–SRC-0140).
- Risks: cannot claim descriptive representativeness — a misleading-representativeness-claim risk; vulnerable to capture by the already-engaged; no one is obliged to respond.
- Software implications: open registration, facilitation tooling, capture/synthesis (Dembrane-style, SRC-0098); no stratified selection needed.
- Cicada requirements: represent open-participation bodies and label their legitimacy basis distinctly — the system must not present self-selection as sortition.
- Unresolved questions: how an open assembly’s outputs acquire institutional force; boundary between open assembly and campaigning event.
Pattern F — Party-internal sortition
Evidence: Your Party institutional sortition — sortition used for internal member-democracy functions including election oversight (SRC-0059–SRC-0062).
- Source of legitimacy: party rules + member equality; internal constitutional role.
- Membership basis: party membership as the population frame.
- Selection method: sortition within membership; oversight functions.
- Permanence: defined by party rules.
- Agenda authority: party governance organs.
- Mandate: internal — oversight/scrutiny rather than public policy recommendation.
- Response obligation: internal party reporting.
- Accountability: to the party membership/rules.
- Relationship to elected bodies: none direct — party-internal.
- Strengths: demonstrates sortition doing non-assembly work (oversight, internal election integrity); population frame is clean (membership list).
- Risks: party governance is politically adversarial; legitimacy depends on party rule quality; functions can be revoked cheaply.
- Software implications: member-frame selection, oversight rosters, internal mandates — a distinct institution type.
- Cicada requirements: represent non-public bodies and organisational-population selection.
- Unresolved questions: whether internal-party sortition evidence transfers to public institutions; transparency duties inside private organisations.
Pattern G — Mass participation feeding a smaller deliberative body
Evidence: THEORY-TO-PRACTICE mass-input channel finding; Polis-style opinion mapping at scale (SRC-0091–SRC-0094); Decidim/CONSUL public participation channels (SRC-0082–SRC-0088); Newham’s public topic vote (SRC-0048).
- Source of legitimacy: breadth of participation + the deliberative body’s downstream judgement; the mass channel’s legitimacy is distributive (opinion landscape), not decisional.
- Membership basis: two populations — open mass participants and separately selected assembly members.
- Selection method: mass channel is self-selected; the mini-public is stratified. The corpus is explicit that these must not be conflated (SRC-0106, SRC-0120).
- Permanence: either.
- Agenda authority: can originate in mass input (petitions, topic votes, seeded statements).
- Mandate: mass input is evidence/agenda material; the mini-public issues recommendations.
- Response obligation: as per the host institution.
- Accountability: mass input must be labelled with its bias profile — it is not representative.
- Relationship to elected bodies: typically supplements a Pattern A–D institution.
- Strengths: combines scale with deliberative quality; agenda legitimacy can come from the public.
- Risks: treating mass input as if it were representative; Polis-type cluster outputs mistaken for decisions; mass channel drowning member judgement.
- Software implications: the mass-input channel is a different object from membership — different data, different claims; mature external tools exist (Polis public API, Decidim/CONSUL portals).
- Cicada requirements: represent mass input as evidence/agenda material with an explicit bias profile; never merge it with the selected-membership record.
- Unresolved questions: how much agenda authority mass input should carry; moderation/misinformation duties on open channels.
Cross-pattern requirements
| Dimension | A one-off | B permanent | C standing local | D hybrid | E open | F party | G mass+mini |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Population/frame | yes | yes | yes | yes | optional | members | two populations |
| Stratified selection | yes | yes | yes | yes | no | yes | mini only |
| Rotation/cohorts | no | yes | yes | per topic | no | rules | no |
| Agenda authority object | commissioner | self/mixed | public vote | parliament | movement | party | mixed |
| Response obligation | variable | institutionalised | commitment | parliamentary | none | internal | via host |
| Receiving authority | commissioner | parliament/council | council | chamber | none | party organs | host |
| Implementation tracking | thin | droit de suite class | commitment | parliamentary | none | internal | via host |
Shared requirement: every pattern must declare — as recorded governance objects, not software defaults — its legitimacy source, selection method, agenda authority, mandate type, response obligation and accountability instrument.
Sources
research/methods/METHOD-COMPARISON.md;research/theory/THEORY-TO-PRACTICE.md;research/theory/permanent-and-rotating-assemblies.md;research/theory/sortition-elections-and-hybrids.md;research/theory/mass-participation-and-mini-publics.md- SRC-0017, SRC-0021, SRC-0025, SRC-0027, SRC-0030, SRC-0038, SRC-0041–SRC-0048, SRC-0059–SRC-0068, SRC-0106, SRC-0109, SRC-0111, SRC-0118, SRC-0120, SRC-0125, SRC-0132–SRC-0140