Privacy and data classification
CA-A1 architecture record. Updated: 2026-10-05. Every object carries privacy_class + retention_class. Respondents who were not selected get special care — they are the population holding the most sensitive silent data with no public role.
Classes
| Class | Contents | Visibility | Retention | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
public-institutional | institution records, remits, decisions, responses, bundles | public | permanent | the published corpus of the institution |
internal-institutional | working drafts, operational notes | institution staff/members | term-bound | not publishable by default |
member-identity | seated/reserve member identity | per institution’s participant_privacy_model (named/pseudonymous/protected) | term-bound → archival descriptor | Brussels protected model representable |
respondent-identity | contact + identity of pool | operators only; never auditors or members | privacy-limited — deletion schedule declared in spec | non-selected respondents: shortest retention |
selection-attributes | strata-visible features | anonymised projection only to engine; raw never leaves custody | privacy-limited | attitudinal/special-category flags require declared legal basis (CA-REQ-012) |
support-needs | disability/care/literacy provisions | member-declared; visible only to provision-deliverers | privacy-limited | the need is not a public fact (CA-REQ-073) |
contact-data | addresses/phones/emails | operators + members’ own | privacy-limited | never on the selection-engine seam |
public-profile | name/photo/bio where model is named | public | member-controlled | optional per member even under named models |
protected-deliberation | session content under protection | members + secretariat | institution-declared | Brussels statutory-protection class |
public-deliberation | published minutes/transcripts | public | permanent | minutes are public artefacts |
evidence | submissions + disclosures | public / members / protected per item | permanent (public) / term-bound (protected) | conflict disclosures included |
audit-artefact | bundles, digests, witness records | public (digest-level) / auditor (content-level) | permanent | verification needs digests public, raw inputs protected |
Export and deletion
- Deletion is an event — retention burn-down is recorded (when, under which rule, how many records — never which people, post-deletion).
- Export for verification emits the anonymised matrix + digests, never identity columns — the audit surface and privacy surface are complementary by design.
- Small-cell protection: publication suppresses attribute combinations that re-identify members (documented corpus risk; RISK-MATRIX).